For Justice Scalia, sources of arguments matter. According to Justice Scalia, the Constitution limits the sources courts may cite in written opinions. One source Justice Scalia views as improper is the legislative history compiled by Congress. Though his antipathy toward legislative history was known before he joined the Supreme Court, 1 over time he has reasserted this view with renewed vigor.
However, Justice Scalia uses a different rule for sources of authority in his constitutional opinions. Although he adheres to a "textualist" approach when interpreting statutes, he adopts an "originalist" stance with regard to the Constitution. These theories of interpretation profoundly differ: The textualist looks only at the words of a statute, whereas the originalist examines both the words and additional sources that shed light on what the words originally were intended to mean. This Note examines Justice Scalia's choices and uses of sources in his statutory and constitutional opinions. The reasons he gives for his inconsistent treatment of sources fail to persuade, and a case could be made that precisely the opposite approach would be more appropriate. Yet perhaps the most significant aspect of Justice Scalia's approach to the use of sources (in either statutory or constitutional adjudication) is the effect it has on redistributing power among the three branches of government. Refusing to consult legislative history reduces the power of the legislative branch, and it allows both the executive (especially including administrative agencies) and the judiciary more room to promulgate and pursue their own views. In contrast, willingness to consult the Constitution's "legislative history" again reduces the power of the legislative branch: The judicial rather than the legislative interpretation of a constitutional provision is more likely to determine whether the statute in question is unconstitutional. As long as the legislative branch is controlled by a different political party than controls the other branches, Justice Scalia's interpretive practices have clear practical consequences.
II. ESCHEWING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

A. The Rule
Justice Scalia has not hidden his disdain for the use of legislative history. He would be happy if Congress produced no legislative history at all, 2 and he thinks it has no place in determining the "ordinary meaning ' 3 or the constitutionality 4 of a statute.
In a large number of opinions, Justice Scalia avoids using legislative history in a statutory interpretation simply by asserting that the Court could have reached the same result based on the language of the statute. 5 Justice Scalia's position in these concurrences can be understood best as an argument for judicial economy. Every canon of statutory construction supports the conclusion that the court should start from the text of the statute. 6 If the statutory text supplies an answer to the issue, the judge need not delve further into the legislative record. When statutory language is clear, the judge would only use the legislative history to confirm what she already discovered. And even if the judge finds a clear conflict between the legislative history and statutory language, common precepts of statutory construction would require her to ignore the legislative history in interpreting the statute. 7 Another reason Justice Scalia suggests for ignoring legislative history is the process by which some committee reports are generated. In 2. Sable Communications v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829, 2840 (1989) (concurring) ("Neither due process nor the First Amendment requires legislation to be supported by committee reports, floor debates, or even consideration, but only by a vote.").
This Note varies Bluebook style by presuming that all decisions, whether majority, concurrence, or dissent, are authored by Justice Scalia, unless otherwise indicated.
3. Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 109 S. Ct. 1981 Ct. , 1994 Ct. (1989 5. See, eg ., Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702, 2724 (1989) (concurring) ("I join Parts I and IV of the Court's opinion, and Part III except insofar as it relies upon legislative history."); H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2907 (1989) (concurring) (deriding the majority opinion for " [e] levating to the level of statutory text a phrase taken from the legislative history.").
For a traditional account of the canons of statutory interpretation, see R. DICKERSON, THE
The theme that staffers rather than Members of Congress create legislative history also appears in Blanchard v. Bergeron, which also involved interpretation of the Equal Access to Justice Act. 1 1 Here, his concern was that Justice White's majority opinion began from the premise that a group of cases named in the committee report accompanying the Equal Access to Justice Act, which the committee highlighted as examples of proper interpretations. Again, Justice Scalia asserted that Members of Congress were ignorant of the contents of the report. 12 After proclaiming congressional ignorance, he highlighted what for him was the galling psychology of the members of committee staffs: "What a heady feeling it must be for a young staffer, to know that his or her citation of obscure district court cases can transform them into the law of the land .... -"13 Justice Scalia refused to join the majority opinion because its process of analysis was "neither compatible with our judicial responsibility or assuring reasoned, consistent and effective application of the statutes of the United States, nor conducive to a genuine effectuation of congressional intent, to give legislative force to each snippet of analysis
"14
Justice Scalia brought together several reasons for rejecting legislative history in Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co. 15 That case involved a county prisoner on work-release who was seriously injured by an allegedly defective car washing machine at his place of employment. After the prisoner testified at trial, the defendant's attorney sought to impeach him by questioning him about his criminal record. The plaintiff argued that the case turned on the meaning of Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a), and Frickey provide a larger context for the snippet of legislative history, and conclude that in fact Senator Dole did claim to have reviewed the Committee Report, and did vouch for its accuracy. Another criticism of this passage is that it came from a piece of legislation unrelated to the legislation at issue in Hirschey. Finding one piece of legislative history not produced according to proper procedures does not prove that other legislative history does not merit reliance. By analogy, Justice Scalia could argue that because some Supreme Court decisions were written by clerks rather than judges, all Supreme Court opinions should be ignored.
11. 109 S. Ct. 939, 946 (1989) (concurring in part and concurring in the judgment which allows the introduction of evidence of prior convictions for impeachment only when "the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant ..
... 16 The trial judge had not weighed the prejudicial effect in this case, believing that Rule 609(a)(1) applies only to criminal proceedingsthe reference to "defendant" meant "criminal defendant." Justice Stevens examined a lengthy history of Bar Association committee reports, running back several decades, to find the district court's understanding of the Rule was correct. Justice Scalia then noted that the controversy could be limited to whether the word "defendant" meant "criminal defendant," "civil plaintiff, civil defendant and criminal defendant," or "civil plaintiff, civil defendant, prosecutor and criminal defendant." 19 Because the first solution was most consistent with the meaning of the text, Justice Scalia considered the district court's interpretation correct. No need to go further, according to Justice Scalia, and Justice Stevens' historical analysis was not only superfluous but also insidious, since it "produc[es] a legal culture in which, when counsel arguing before us assert that 'Congress has said' something, they now frequently mean, by 'Congress,' a committee report ... ."20 Justice Scalia saw no need to explain why such a legal culturewould be undesirable. Finally, Justice Scalia contends that legislative history should be ignored because it may not be directly related to the vote of legislators. In Edwards v. Aguillard the majority, relying in part on some legislators' stated intentions, found that a Louisiana statute requiring high schools to teach "creation science" as well as "evolution science" in biology courses violated the first amendment's establishment clause. 2 1 In his dissent, Justice Scalia derided the majority's reliance on legislative intentions. After an extensive analysis of the legislative history, which Justice Scalia found conformed to the requirements set forth in past Supreme Court precedents that legislation have some secular purpose, 2 2 he argued that the legislative history was irrelevant. If a legislator asserted that he had accidentally pressed the "yes" button instead of the "no" button during a vote, and if it was clear that this mistake passed a law that otherwise would have been defeated, then this aspect of "legislative history" would not invalidate the law. A showing of non-intention is irrelevant to the constitutional validity of the law. The same would be true if legislative history indicated that a legislator had been influenced by a deal to gain support for an unrelated bill, a desire to get a session over with so he could go fishing, or any other factor irrelevant to the merits of the proposed Act. Therefore, Scalia argued, the fact that a legislator might have been influenced by his religious beliefs also should be irrelevant.
23
B. Separation of Powers as a Justification for Prohibiting the Use of Legislative History
Unique among his brethren on the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia has asserted that there is a constitutional reason for ignoring legislative history. The Constitution itself limits the legislature to a specific role: Congress may pass laws on topics listed in the Constitution, 24 and it must accomplish the legislative task according to the method set forth in 21. 482 U.S. 579, 591-94 (1987) (Brennan, J., majority). The result was based in part on the finding that the legislature intended for the particular legislation to grant approval to one branch of evangelical Christianity. See id. 22 . Id. at 619-36 (dissenting). 23. Id. at 636-37. However, it is central to a wide range of constitutional cases and statutory cases that even where a particular action was totally discretionary in the governmental actor, it could not be undertaken for a "wrong" motive. Justice Scalia implicitly endorsed this view in J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 109 S. Ct. 706, 735 (1989) (concurring), where he agreed that although a city may hire any contractor or no contractor, it may not choose one contractor over another on the basis of skin color. 24 . U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. He also would presumably recognize the rights of Congress to act on impeachments, and on procedural matters to the extent these are enumerated in id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (choice of Speaker of the House); id. § 3, cl. 5 (choice of Senate officers); id. § 4, cl. 1 (limited power on regulation of elections of members); id. § 5 (determination of internal rules, procedural rules for debate, and adjournment).
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the Constitution. 25 The creation of legislative history is not among the constitutional duties. 26 Further, the process of creating statutes must include votes by both legislative branches on bills with identical wording and a presidential signature (or the override of a veto)-without this process, no legislation has been passed. 2 7 Accordingly, the legislative history, which has not been subjected to review by the other house and the President, is not part of the law. To complete the circle, the Constitution limits the courts to considering "Cases... arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties .... -2 8 Courts have no jurisdiction to review controversies arising under a provision of legislative history.
29
According to this theory, congressional intimations that courts should consider the legislative history of a statute may be outside the scope of congressional powers, and an unconstitutional attempt at congressional self-aggrandizement. 30 Courts charged with enforcing article I of the Constitution and with the balancing of powers implicit in the con- The principle of our democratic system is not that each legislature enacts a purpose, independent of the language in a statute, which the courts must perpetuate, assuring that it is fully achieved but never overshot by expanding or ignoring the statutory language as changing circumstances require. To the contrary, it seems to me the prerogative of each currently elected Congress to allow those laws which change has rendered nugatory to die.., and to allow those laws whose effects have been expanded by change to remain alive if it favors the new effects. [Vol. 1990:160
when it decides not to repeal or revise them. 39 For Justice Scalia, originalism is always inappropriate in interpreting statutes.
D. Legislative History in Treaty Interpretation
Treaties present a special obstacle to a Justice who hopes to divine the intent of a document's creator. Whose intent matters? A treaty has multiple legislative histories: the histories developed by the signatories to the treaty and the history accompanying Senate ratification. 4° For Justice Scalia, the possibility of multiple histories is another reason to avoid legislative history altogether.
Justice Scalia found reason to avoid consultation of the legislative history of a treaty in his first Supreme Court decision, O'Connor v. United States, in which he ruled in favor of the government's interpretation of a treaty affecting U.S. income taxation. 41 In explaining the Court's decision, Justice Scalia stated: "While the Claims Court may have been correct that the negotiating history does not favor the Government's position sufficiently to overcome what that court regarded as a plain textual meaning in favor of the taxpayers, it certainly does not favor the taxpayers' position sufficiently to affect our view of the text." 42 Scalia expounded his views on the value of using treaty history at greater length in Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., a case arising from the 1983 destruction of a Korean Air Lines aircraft by a Soviet missile. The airline sought to invoke a provision in the Warsaw Convention (as modified by a later treaty) that limited its liability to $75,000 per passenger. The airline had printed the liability limitation on tickets in eightpoint type, significantly smaller than the ten-point type required by the treaty. The issue for the Court was whether this violation invalidated the liability limitation. Liability depended on which of two facially inconsistent passages of the treaty were to be given force. Justice Scalia refused to examine the treaty's history, dismissing the Solicitor General's and the Petitioners' attempts by noting that they "seek to explain the variance between Section I and Sections II and III (as well as the clear text of Article 3) as a drafting error, and lead us through the labyrinth of the Convention's drafting history in an effort to establish this point.""4 Jus-39. This approach makes the circular assumption that the current Congress decided not to repeal or revise on the basis of what it read in the words of the statute, not on the basis of the statute's meaning at the time it was written.
40. If the other nation signing the treaty also created a legislative history, there conceivably could be a third source.
41 44. Id. at 1683.
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tice Scalia refuted the petitioners' argument by constructing a concededly hypothetical alternative treaty purpose, which proved that the treaty as written might not have been irrational. The hypothetical legislative intent leads to an outcome inconsistent with the legislative history, so Justice Scalia ignores the legislative history, in favor of "the text." Unsurprisingly, the opinion finds the text sufficiently clear to conclude there should be no penalty against the airline. Justice Scalia's harshest words on the use of treaty history appear in his concurring opinion in United States v. Stuart. 4 5 The issue in that case was whether a tax treaty with Canada allowed the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to supply information to the Canadian tax authority even though that agency was commencing a criminal investigation. This presented a problem because the IRS is forbidden by statute from issuing a summons to further a criminal investigation of a United States taxpayer. 46 Justice Brennan's majority opinion held that the treaty's plain language allowed information disclosure, and the legislative history developed in the United States Senate ratification hearings of the treaty corroborated this understanding. Although Justice Scalia agreed with the Court's conclusion, he took exception to its reliance, even for corroboration, on the Senate legislative history. Asserting first that "[tihe use of such materials is unprecedented," Justice Scalia then explains why those materials should not be consulted: "Using preratification Senate materials ... is rather like determining the meaning of a bilateral contract between two corporations on the basis of what the Board of Directors of one of them thought it meant when authorizing the Chief Executive Officer to conclude it." ' 47 He further noted that the Supreme Court previously refused to give effect to explicit conditions of ratification of a treaty, and in Scalia's view conditions or stipulations in a committee report should receive no more respect than resolutions passed by the full Senate.
At the end of the concurrence, Justice Scalia explains his concern is not so much with the case at hand (where, after all, he concurs in the [Vol. 1990:160 judgment) as with unrelated issues pending in other arenas. In particular, he names a then-pending controversy over the Senate's interpretation of the Anti-Ballistic Missiles Treaty 48 (ABM treaty), and two cases recently decided by the District Court for the District of Columbia. 49 These controversies all hinged on whether the Executive branch may be bound to the interpretation of a treaty that it expounded in ratification hearings before the Senate. Justice Scalia then goes far out of his way to issue an advisory opinion to the administration on how he would rule on this issue:
[T]he Government conceded that "authoritative Executive branch representations concerning the meaning of a Treaty which form part of the basis upon which the Senate gives advice and consent are entitled to be accorded binding weight as a matter of domestic constitutional law, and the Executive branch fully accepts that it is bound by such statements." It is not clear that this latest position taken by the Government in the District Court is correct, or would even be the position taken by the Solicitor General. interpretation are enacted by Congress, Congress is the obvious place to turn to determine what, if anything, the statutory words mean. 5 2 Justice Scalia has proposed that courts ignore Congress's own explanation of the words it has chosen in favor of more general definitional sources, such as a dictionary or a thesaurus. 5 3 Yet such sources will shed light on congressional intent only if Congress anticipated the question and relied on the same source as the courts.
More significantly, Justice Scalia's discussions frequently suggest that the Court often faces a choice between relying on legislative history or commonly accepted principles of adjudication. However, the choice before the Court could be described, equally accurately, as between following the congressional judgment on a particular issue or following some other standard in making a decision. Relying on an adminstrative agency's interpretation-an approach Justice Scalia favors 54 -is no more "neutral" than reliance on legislative history. And to the extent agency interpretation replaces the judgment of elected officials with the judgment of civil servants, it is less democratic. Further, the creation of legislative history is sanctioned by the Constitution 55 whereas decisionmaking through an administrative process is not. 
See generally P. STRAUSS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE
UNITED STATES 12 (1989) ("[T]he Constitution... does not define the government itself. That is to say, it does not define the bureaucracy, the specialist institutions that carry out the specific tasks of public affairs.").
57. Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 109 S. Ct. 1981, 1994 (1989) (concurring in the judgment). Three dissenting Supreme Court justices, however, found a version of the "irrational" meaning the proper one.
[Vol. 1990:160 with one created by an unelected judge whose constitutional role is limited to deciding cases, not rewriting laws to fit his own sense of rationality. s8 From the point of view of fidelity to either the Constitution or the principle of democracy, then, reliance on legislative history is superior to reliance on other sources. Justice Scalia's prudential reasons for avoiding legislative history are no more convincing. It may be true that the Court should not encourage Congress to circumvent the legislative process by passing vague laws and then relying on precise legislative history to direct the Executive Branch enforcing the laws. However, Professors Glicksman and Shapiro have argued that Executive refusal to follow clearly expressed congressional intent in legislative histories forces Congress to make the opposite mistake: to legislate with too much detail. 5 9 For example, the perceived need to legislate with too much specificity in the environmental field 6 " has forced Congress to make scientific judgments, relying to a greater extent on its staff in areas in which it often lacks expertise. Because Congress almost always acts prospectively, it is poorly equipped to allow exceptions to statutes of general application, even where a fundamental sense of justice might require an exception. A Member of Congress might be more comfortable explaining her intent in a committee report rather than writing a more specific bill if she reasonably believed the interpreters of the statute would look to the committee report for guidance, and follow it, absent some unforeseeable but compelling reason to act otherwise. Senator Biden has asserted that a long-standing, negotiated balance of power between the Executive and Legislative branches makes less formal communications, such as Senate reports, especially crucial in the area of Senate influence over foreign policy 62 and treaty interpretation. 63 Because foreign policy actions frequently require greater statutory delegations to the Executive Branch (otherwise, the President would be unable to react to rapidly changing events, or to negotiate treaties) the Senate has in the past coupled delegation with various mechanisms for The recurrent argument that legislative history is created by nonlegislators and therefore inadmissible, is completely fallacious. All three branches of government commonly delegate the job of drafting written material to staff members. A Member of Congress may not have read the legislation she is voting, any more than she read the legislative history; this fact does not reduce the importance of either document to the nation. 67 Moreover, the fact that a judicial clerk rather than a duly confirmed article III judge wrote a particular opinion does not make it less binding on lower courts. Similarly, if the President accepts without reservation an aide's or an astrologer's recommendation that a bill be vetoed, and even signs ihe veto message proposed by the aide without reading it, the veto still would have legal force. 6 8 What should count is not who operates the word processor, but whether the proper elected official accepts responsibility for the words, according to proper procedures.
Finally, it is not the case that a Member of Congress may slip authoritative comments favoring special interest groups into legislative his- 66. Biden, supra note 30, at 1539. 67. Anyone who has read both will admit, however, that committee reports are much more accessible than statutory language to the average reader. Because of that committee reports may be more likely to be read, by Members of Congress as well as by the general public.
68. Thus, the fact that President Reagan chose the moment for announcing his choice of Justice Kennedy's appointment on the basis of his astrologer's unreviewed recommendation did not render the appointment invalid, even though the Constitution grants responsibility for judicial nominations to the President and not the astrologer. [Vol. 1990:160 tory that otherwise would not have been acceptable to the legislature as a whole. Both the House and the Senate have rules governing the production of committee reports, mandating both the contents of a legislative history and the means by which it is produced. 69 These rules require that committee records be kept openly and contain an adequate explanation of the congressional action under consideration, including cost estimates, regulatory impact analysis, and other specific topics. 70 Members of the committees have an opportunity to publish concurring or dissenting views. 7 1 Indeed, minority staff and staff of committee members closely monitor the writing process, and tell their boss either to object to an offending provision contrary to the will of the committee, or to fie views to the report, signalling the controversy to other Members. Thus, an uncontradicted statement in a legislative history could not appear unless no other committee member of the committee believed it was important to contradict that statement. Further, the reports must be available to the full House and Senate, and any Member of Congress is free to raise questions on the floor with respect to the committee report, or to vote against a piece of legislation because she disagrees with the committee report, whether or not she supports the text of the proposed legislation. In other words, the congressional review of legislative history is not very different from the congressional review of legislation.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
A. Is the Constitution Different?
At least since the time of Chief Justice Marshall, 7 2 Supreme Court Justices and legal commentators frequently have argued that the rules for understanding and interpreting the Constitution differ from the rules for interpreting a statute. Because the words of the Constitution are generally immutable and the Constitution was created at a unique moment in American history, it should be treated differently from statutes regularly enacted at the will of Congress. For example, a court can fashion a remedy for violations of the Constitution, even in the absence of any explicit it is a Constitution we are interpreting.").
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[Vol. 1990:160 grant of private remedy. 73 On the other hand, Supreme Court opinions interpreting the Constitution should be accorded less stare decisis weight because they cannot be undone by the legislature if erroneous. 74 Finally, the Framers of the Constitution are more distant from us in both time and worldview, and their concerns are more alien to us, than the understandings of the authors of virtually all statutes. Whether the original, historical meaning of the Constitution, as evidenced by views the Framers expressed outside of the text of the Constitution itself, should be consulted is a controversial issue.
75
Justice Scalia, however, has rejected in one sense the notion that the Constitution is inherently different from a statute:
[T]he Constitution, though it has an effect superior to other laws, is in its nature the sort of "law" that is the business of the courts-an enactment that has a fixed meaning ascertainable through the usual devices familiar to those learned in law.
76
So, regardless of the reasons for considering the Constitution differently, for Justice Scalia it is in the end simply a document for a court to interpret. 75. The Office of Legal Policy has asserted: In fact, the justifications for looking beyond the text are even weaker for statutes than for the Constitution. First, most statutes that are the subject of litigation are of relatively recent origin, and the original meaning of their language is the same as the contemporary meaning. Second, the legal rules in statutes are usually spelled out in greater detail than those in the Constitution. Third, the Constitution specifies rules for the enactment of statutes that imply severe limits on the use of legislative history, but since these rules are obviously inapplicable to the Constitution itself, they are not directly relevant to constitutional interpretation. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 31, at 26 n.97. A complete refutation of this view is beyond the scope of this Note. However, the first justification is out of step with Justice Scalia's view of the interpretation of old statutes, see supra text accompanying notes 35-38, and the second directly contradicts the Office of Legal Counsel's view that legislative history should not be used to fill gaps. Id at 97-104. Finally, the Constitution also specifies rules for its own ratification, which on their own terms appear to preclude the consultation of secondary sources for constitutional interpretation. See infra text accompanying notes 89-92. 76. Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 852 (1989). Curiously, though, the "usual devices" Justice Scalia lists in the passages that follow include examination of "legislative history," and similar sources, which he precludes from consideration in statutory decisions.
77. In light of Justice Scalia's views of statutory interpretation, one might expect that "the usual devices" to which he refers include careful examination of the text, perhaps aided by a dictionary. But this turns out not to be the case. See, eg., id. at 859 (citing THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, BLACKsTONE'S COMMENTARIES, and the Debates at the North Carolina State Ratifying Convention).
agency's decision, it should be interpreted to preclude challenge on constitutional as well as statutory grounds:
The only respect in which a constitutional claim is necessarily more significant than any other kind of claim is that ... it can be asserted against the legislature itself, whereas a nonconstitutional claim... cannot. That is an important distinction.... But it has no relevance to the question whether, as between executive violations of statutes and executive violations of the Constitution-both of which are equally unlawful, and neither of which can be said, a priori, to be more harmful or more unfair to the plaintiff-one or the other category should be favored by a presumption against exclusion of judicial review. 78 The special concerns about violations of constitutional rights that motivated Chief Justice John Marshall in McCullough carry no weight against the asserted right of Congress to limit the judiciary's jurisdiction in any way that it chooses (even though the jurisdictional limitation is far from clear).
Thus, if a statute and the Constitution do not conflict, Justice Scalia would interpret both according to the same rules. Based on the rules he uses for interpreting statutes, then, one would expect that Justice Scalia would rely on the text of the Constitution as the sole source of its meaning.
These expectations, however, would be disappointed. Justice Scalia's views on constitutional interpretation, unlike his position on statutory interpretation, resemble the views of other conservative judges. He is an originalist who seeks to interpret the Constitution as the Framers would have understood it. 79 This view is not absolute-for example, Justice Scalia does not advocate overturning longstanding precedents simply because they do not accord with some of the founders' beliefs on a particular issue. 80 However, Justice Scalia's outlook informs his beliefs and decisions in most areas. 8 ' Where precedent has deviated in a substantial way from original intent, it should have limited application in 78. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 618 (1988) (dissenting). In this case, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion reinstated a wrongful discharge action by a CIA employee who had been fired because of his homosexuality. The plaintiffhad argued that this action violated the fourteenth amendment. The majority's opinion argued that the statute forbidding challenges to CIA employment decisions was inapplicable to a constitutional challenge. Because the decision reversed a district court's dismissal, the Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the claim.
79. Scalia, supra note 76, at 852. Compare this position to that taken in Confirmation Hearings, supra note 7, at 48-49, where Justice Scalia refused to be pinned down to an originalist position, but conceded that he was "more inclined to the original meaning than... to a phrase like 'living Constitution.'" 80. Scalia's favorite example of this is the possibility that a historian might discover that Marbury was incorrectly decided. Scalia 
B. The Problems with Constitutional History
The problems of the unreliability of the record of the constitutional "legislative history" 8 4 are greater than they are with recently enacted statues. After all, the Convention did not publish a record of proceedings, and most of the currently available record was created from James Madison's notes, which were not published until 1840, and have long been considered to be of uncertain accuracy. 8 5 There is little evidence that the Framers expected courts to use their notes and debates as guides to legal interpretation. 86 In some respects, the Constitution also may be understood as a treaty between separate sovereign states. The individual states ratified In another group of cases, he casts a wider net, using a variety of secondary sources to determine the common meaning of language used in the Constitution. the document in the same manner that nations would ratify a treaty. 8 7 As a result of the common requirement of ratification, many of the justifications for ignoring the legislative history of treaties also apply to constitutional materials. The state ratifying conventions created separate "legislative histories" from the national Convention. And since nine state ratifications were necessary before the Constitution would have legal effect, 88 Justice Scalia's reasons for rejecting the legislative history of treaties should apply with greater force to the Constitution. Justice Scalia's occasional reliance on The Federalist Papers 89 is especially ironic because they were not written or published until after the Constitution had taken effect. 90 Those writings were intended to influence the New York Ratification, Convention, but since New York was the tenth state to ratify, its ratification had no legal effect. concurring) , a case where the only relevant constitutional provision was the fourteenth amendment. Justice Scalia approvingly quotes Madison's view that in a smaller rather than a larger community, the majority will be more likely to be able to oppress those who disagree with it. This argument is uncharacteristically sloppy. First, Madison's views on the dangers of oppression of a minority referred to individuals who differed in political, not racial characteristics. Since Scalia has argued that the discrimination here is especially invidious because it is racial, Madison has nothing to say. More importantly, though, Madison's theory of federalism, and of the balancing of local, state, and federal interests, is completely irrelevant. If Madison was advocating granting the federal judiciary power to review local governmental decisions, his view was not incorporated into the final Constitution. All of the arguments presented in Croson concern the fourteenth amendment, enacted in 1870, and without the benefit of Madison's draftsmanship. Since Scalia does not (and cannot) argue that the fourteenth amendment was part of a plan to fulfill Madison's vision of the federal government in the states, the quotation has no persuasive power in relation to the issue the Court faces.
90. See U.S. CONST. art. VII (Constitution becomes effective upon ratification by nine states). 91. Of course, the ratifications by the final four states had tremendouspractical effects. If New York had not approved of the Constitution, the United States might well have fallen apart. It would be very surprising if any New York court would accept the Constitution as legally binding, if that state had not ratified it. However, Justice Scalia applies formalistic standards to the use of legislative history in statutory contexts; if we consider the Constitution to be a statute, its interpretative materials should receive the same treatment.
92. See supra text accompanying note 32.
constitutional records is that they were unavailable to almost all of the states ratifying the Constitution, since they were published late in the ratifying process. In this respect, they resemble the legislative history associated with a treaty that Justice Scalia abhors using. 93 Finally, the Federalist Papers arguably are more comparable to letters by a Congressman to his constituents than to committee reports. Garry Wills has argued persuasively that Madison occasionally misrepresented the Constitution to make it appear less threatening to its opponents or closer to Madison's preferred form of government.
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The most venerable argument opposing attempts to ascertain the Framers' intent is that they were aware they were writing a document that would last a very long time, and they intentionally chose language that could be interpreted flexibly. 95 A related argument is that the Framers did not expect their documentary records to be consulted, thus to do so violates their intention. 96 The fact that the Framers made no attempt to publish the Conventions records until much later and published the Federalist Papers anonymously contrasts with the practices of contemporary legislators, who require themselves to distribute publicly complete legislative histories to the general public, generally within seven working days.
IV. EFFECT OF JUSTICE SCALIA'S RULES FOR BALANCE OF POWER
By now, it should be clear that Justice Scalia's originalism depends heavily on secondary sources to interpret the Constitution's provisions, but he ignores both secondary sources and congressional intent in interpreting statutes. The inconsistency is most apparent in the cases discussing separation of powers, where Justice Scalia cannot be a textualist since he has no text. In other words, the text of Justice Scalia's Constitution is larger than the official text in the United States Code-it incorporates the Federalist Papers and the Documentary History of the Constitutional Convention, among other documents-whereas his book of statutes is precisely the same size.
Why this inconsistency? Curiously, the originalist approach to constitutional decisions has the same effect on the balance of powers as the 93 [Vol. 1990:160 textualist approach to statutory decisions, 98 at least in terms of the power of the legislature. In the simplest formulation, both rules reduce the legislature's power.
A. The Separation of Powers Decisions
Justice Scalia's views on the respective rights and powers of different branches of the government are forcefully stated, controversial, and may be the area of his greatest intellectual contribution. This Note analyses those decisions because they reveal Justice Scalia's method and the political conclusions that follow from his decision to consult secondary sources in constitutional interpretation. 99 If the Constitution is the same as a statute, as Justice Scalia suggests, then determining that a legislative enactment is unconstitutional based on "separation of powers" is problematic because neither the words nor concept of judicial review of legislation for separation of powers problems appear anywhere in the text of the Constitution. 1 00 The Constitution defines three separate duties: the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial. In some areas, the enumerated powers of the three branches overlap. 101 To Justice Scalia, the fact that there is no specific mention of separation of powers in the Constitution does not signify there is no basis for judicial decisions on issues involving separation of powers. 10 2 Instead, he believes that the Supreme Court has a duty to police the balance of pow- . In a statutory context, Scalia might have assumed that leaving a provision out precluded the judiciary from using its terms to decide cases. Cf Confirmation Hearings, supra note 9, at 75, where Senator Heflin quoted an earlier speech by Justice Scalia where he stated that the strongest form of legislative history is the case where a particular provision appeared on a draft and was later dropped by the full legislature.
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But without any textual clues, how can the judiciary decide when a law or action violates separation of powers? The Supreme Court's body of precedent is rarely much help, since there were few cases on these issues before the 1970s.1 0 4 The only textual clues are the three talismanic phrases: Legislative power, Executive power, and Judicial power. Consulting a dictionary-either a modem one or one in use in the 1780s1°5 -for insight into these terms is unlikely to answer the issue. A review of prominent recent separation of powers cases illustrates how Justice Scalia fashions an answer to this issue.
1. Synar. Justice Scalia's first major ruling on separation of powers decision was the per curiam decision in Synar v. United States, 106 in which a three-judge panel (including Judge Scalia) held the GrammRudman-Hollings Act' 0 7 included an unconstitutional delegation of executive powers to a legislative officer.1 0 8 As a result of the opinion, both congressional authority to make budget decisions according to Congress's wishes, and the authority of congressional agents was limited.
The court found the law unconstitutional, not because it violated any provision of the Constitution, but because "it violates the fundamental 103. At his confirmation hearings, Justice Scalia asserted in his introductory remarks that the structural aspects of the Constitution were far more important for the preservation of a free democracy than were the Bill of Rights. He noted that the Soviet Constitution has some language similar to that in the Bill of Rights, but without procedural checks such language could not restrain the despotic tendencies of any government leader. Confirmation Hearings, supra note 9, at 32. principal expressed by Montesquieu upon which the theory of separated powers rests." 10 9 Besides attributing the idea to Montesquieu, the Court buttresses it with an ambiguous quotation from Federalist No. 48.110 As further authority for this opinion's concededly unique theory of separation of powers, the decision included a lengthy citation to an article by a "respected scholar" who took an originalist approach to a different separation of powers question and relied heavily on secondary sources. 1 ' 2. Young, and Morrison v. Olson. Justice Scalia's first Supreme Court opinion on separation of powers appears as a concurrence in Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils. 11 2 There, the issue was whether a district court had the power to appoint a special prosecutor to pursue a criminal contempt charge arising from violation of a court-ordered civil injunction when the special prosecutor had previously represented the opposing party in the underlying civil action. Justice Brennan's majority opinion held that this practice should be stopped by use of the Supreme Court's supervisory powers," 3 and Justice Blackmun's concurrence viewed the practice as a violation of the criminal defendant's right to due process." 4 Only Justice Scalia understood the issue as a question of separation of powers: Could the typically Executive function of initiating a prosecution be left to an official appointed by the Judiciary? Justice Scalia begins with a discussion of Hamilton's Federalist No. 78, which states that the judiciary "has no influence over either the sword or the purse." ' " 5 Justice Scalia takes this authority, together with Hamilton's approving citation of Montesquieu to the effect that separating the Judiciary from the Legislative and Executive powers is necessary to secure liberty, and concludes that the judiciary has no inherent power to appoint a special prosecutor in any situation, regardless of the equities of a particular case. everywhere-if conducted by Government at all-been conducted never by the legislature, never by the courts, and always by the executive. ' 120 Later in the opinion, Justice Scalia attempts to limit the meaning of the term "inferior officer" of the United States (who may be appointed by the judiciary) 1 21 by appealing to a 1785 dictionary definition. He concludes that the term means "subordinate,"' 122 in part because Hamilton defined it that way in Federalist No. 81.123 Then Justice Scalia returns to the Constitutional Convention debates to prove that some members thought inferior officers did not need to be mentioned because that power to appoint such offices is implicit in the enumerated powers. This perspective, Justice Scalia asserts, proves that the inferior officers authorized could not be anyone important. Since he assumes that a special prosecu- Since the dictionary offers two definitions, and "subordinate" is the second, it would have been equally valid to assume that "inferior" meant "lower in ... value or excellency." In that case, a special prosecutor would clearly be an inferior officer.
123. Id. at 720 ("In Federalist No. 81, Hamilton pauses to describe the 'inferior' courts authorized by Art. III as inferior in the sense that they are 'subordinate' to the Supreme Court.").
[Vol. 1990:160 tor would be someone very important to the founders, the appointment of special prosecutors cannot be allowed. 124 Unfortunately, this circuitous logic ends with a position that the first century of American judges would not have understood, since private, not executive, prosecution was the norm in the colonial period, and independent prosecutors were common in the early days of the Republic. 132. In Union Gas, Justice Scalia interprets both a statute and the eleventh amendment. Thus, his opposing approaches appear especially clear. Compare "It is our task, as I see it, not to enter the minds of the Members of Congress-who need have nothing in mind in order for their votes to be both lawful and effective-but rather to find fair and reasonable meaning to the text of the United States Code .. ", 109 S. Ct. at 2296 with "the Eleventh Amendment was important not merely for what it said but for what it reflected.., the understood background against which the Constitution was adopted .... Id. at 2297.
133. "Sovereign immunity" is a constitutional principle to Justice Scalia, even though it never appears in the text. The concept does appear in Justice Iredell's dissent in Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 449-50 (1793), which Justice Scalia, following Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), believes provides the true meaning of the eleventh amendment. Although the eleventh amendment was passed in order to overrule the Chisholm decision, it is unclear why Justice Iredell's dissent has any special power. Compare Blanchard v. Bergeron, 109 S. Ct. 939, 947 (1989) (concurring in part) (asserting that the Supreme Court, when interpreting a statute, should accord no weight to a congressional committee report endorsing particular cases); see supra text accompanying notes 11-13, 68.
[Vol. 1990:160 cording to Justice Scalia, was meant not merely to limit diversity jurisdiction but also to incorporate the concept of state sovereign immunity into constitutional limits of federal court jurisdiction,1 3 4 federal courts have no jurisdiction over a Superfund indemnity claim against a state. Thus, Justice Scalia follows the originalist approach even in interpreting an amendment to the Constitution (which, after all, he said is like a statute), notably an amendment that sounds like a statute, and he concedes in his opinion that a textualist should reach the opposite result. The decision makes federal courts unavailable to citizens whose statutory rights have been violated by their state governments.
B. Effect on Balance Between Legislative and Judicial Branches
An originalist judge must begin with inquiry into the constitutionality of legislation from the attitude of the Framers. An originalist refuses to defer to another contemporary decisionmaker concerning the constitutionality of a particular decide the limits of their own authority without interference from the courts.
Originalism also makes a Supreme Court Justice's particular theory of the Constitution more important: If a Justice believes the law would not have been approved by the Framers, then a law has no effect, regardless of its historical or substantive significance. As a result, an originalist may have relatively little respect for the doctrine of stare decisis. 137 
C. Effect on Balance Between Legislative and Executive Branches
As several of the cases demonstrate, Justice Scalia recognizes that textualism with statutes reduces the power of individual Members of Congress: Th~ey can no longer express their intentions effectively in any way other than incorporating them in the legislation itself. Obviously, this requirement means that all interpreters of legislation would have fewer constraints than if they were expected to consider the original intent of the legislators. For example, a judge would not need to follow the cases Congress approved when deciding how to calculate attorney fees, since he could do anything the broad words of the statutes will allow. 138 This discretion benefits not only judges and Justices, but the President and the executive agencies that make administrative decisions implementing (or failing to implement) legislation. Justice Scalia clearly intends this result: Agents of the executive should have the authority to interpret legislation as they choose. 139 Indeed, he occasionally has implored executive agencies to ignore congressional intent whenever the administration disagrees with it.140 If he were able to convince the remainder of the Court to follow him, then both executive and judicial agents, when it comes to deciding how to enforce a statute, would have greater power than they now have.
D. The Message to Administrative Decisionmakers
Justice Scalia believes that the Supreme Court should be conscious of its position within the United States government; its decisions not only decide the cases before it but also communicate with other branches of government and with the people. 14 1 But this perspective should apply equally to the legislative branch and suggests an appropriate role for legislative history.
One reason Members of Congress create committee reports is to communicate with the administrative agencies that exercise statutory responsibility for promulgating rules and enforcing the laws. Whether or not information in a report is legally binding, it is the best evidence available to the administrator of the views held by those who wrote the statute. This evidence can be a valuable starting point for the agency, even if they assume some discretion over the matter.142 Agency administrators are aware that suggestions in the legislative history were intended to guide them, and they should know they may be called to explain their actions if they fail to act in accordance with Congress's will. 143 Justice Scalia offers a contradictory, equally clear message: An administrator may be called on to testify before Congress, but he has no reason to be concerned about what he hears. 144 Because the words that appear in the committee reports or in oral testimony are not part of a properly enacted statute presented to the President, they have no significance. According to Justice Scalia's view, testimony on the Hill, and of correspondence between Congress and the agency, are just rituals.
Thus, the non-textual, historical context of the Constitution creates an Executive with powers based on those of the British king, a legislative branch with enumerated powers that can be exercised only by majority or two-thirds votes (in the case of a veto),' 5 0 and a judiciary with the power to decide only "cases and controversies,"' 15 1 a judiciary which must defer to the Executive's but not the Legislature's interpretations of their own power.
Clearly, Justice Scalia's treatment of secondary sources for statutes and the Constitution mirrors the hierarchy he assumes for the executive and legislative branches. He uses outside sources regularly when they tend to decrease the power of the Congress and abjures outside sources when they increase the power of Congress.
It would be unfair to Justice Scalia to connect his belief in the supremacy of the executive over the legislature to the fact that since he has been on the bench, he has been facing executive actions by members of his own political party and legislative actions by the opposition powers of the executive, without any mention of royal prerogatives), and id. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people," not to the executive).
This interpretation also differs from the leading current historical interpretation of the meaning of "executive power" at the time of the Constitution. See, eg., F. MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM 247-49 (1985) (with regard to Executive powers, "experience with colonial and state governors was largely irrelevant"; the drafters "expressly rejected the [royal] prerogative as a guide.") Many non-textualists also would find this theory objectionable. A common argument for reinterpretation of the Constitution is that technological changes have increased opportunities for tyranny by the executive branch, especially the executive's police force. Consider Justice Brandeis' argument that warrantless wiretaps should be unconstitutional:
When the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were adopted, "the form that evil had theretofore taken" had been necessarily simple. Force and violence were then the only means known to man by which a government could directly effect self-incrimination.... party.' 52 Indeed, Justice Scalia has held similar views at least since he was an Assistant Attorney General. 153 Still, the use of legislative history makes a difference. It affects the outcome of Supreme Court decisions, but more importantly it affects the decisionmaking process of administrative agencies, whose discretionary judgments rarely will be reviewed by a court. Justice Scalia's approach, if adopted by the agencies, will free the courts and the agencies from constraints placed on them by Congress, yet it will maintain the constraints on Congress (and on state legislatures) created by the courts with respect to constitutional interpretations. Although saving us from the prospect of legislative tyranny, Justice Scalia's view makes it more difficult for the legislature to save the people from executive tyranny (or, for that matter, judicial tyranny). Taken together, these rules of interpretation reduce the power of the most democratic branch of government, thereby making America less a democracy and more a bureaucratic state. When Justice Scalia reduces the ability of elective representatives to communicate with and coerce the executive branch, he is taking power away from the people. Those who support granting the more democratic branches of government a predominate role among the branches should consider Justice Scalia [Vol. 1990:160
